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The contingent unknowability of facts and its relation with informal, epistemological contexts

dc.creatorMedeiros, Stanley Kreiter
dc.date.accessioned2019-03-13T14:36:11Z
dc.date.available2019-03-13T14:36:11Z
dc.date.issued2017-11-01
dc.identifier.citationMEDEIROS, Stanley Kreiter Bezerra Medeiros. The contingent unknowability of facts and its relation with informal, epistemological contexts. Principia an International journal of epistemology, n. 1, v. 21, p. 61-76, 2017.pt_BR
dc.identifier.issn1414-4217pt_BR
dc.identifier.urihttp://memoria.ifrn.edu.br/handle/1044/1628
dc.description.abstractThis paper focuses on elements that are involved in a specific type of judgment, namely, those involving facts that, in virtue of contingent reasons, are out of our epistemic reach. Its goal is to propose a philosophical explanation about why we, in informal contexts, take some facts as contingently unknowable. In order to accomplish that goal, we develop a theory that defines contingently unknowable facts in a very specific way. We establish three clauses that are jointly necessary and sufficient — so we argue — for taking an arbitrary fact as contingently unknowable. In a variety of contexts, this strategy has the potential of reducing efforts in an epistemological analysis of this particular type of unknowabilitypt_BR
dc.languageporpt_BR
dc.publisherInstituto Federal de Educação, Ciência e Tecnologia do Rio Grande do Nortept_BR
dc.relation.ispartofPrincipia: an internationnal journal of epistemologypt_BR
dc.rightsAcesso Abertopt_BR
dc.subjectNecessary unknowabilitypt_BR
dc.subjectContingent unknowabilitypt_BR
dc.subjectEvidencept_BR
dc.subjectContingencypt_BR
dc.titleThe contingent unknowability of facts and its relation with informal, epistemological contextspt_BR
dc.typeArtigo de Periódicopt_BR
dc.publisher.countryBrasilpt_BR
dc.publisher.departmentCeará-Mirimpt_BR
dc.publisher.initialsIFRNpt_BR
dc.subject.cnpqCNPQ: CIÊNCIAS HUMANASpt_BR
dc.citation.volume1pt_BR
dc.citation.issue21pt_BR
dc.citation.spage61pt_BR
dc.citation.epage76pt_BR
dc.description.resumoThis paper focuses on elements that are involved in a specific type of judgment, namely, those involving facts that, in virtue of contingent reasons, are out of our epistemic reach. Its goal is to propose a philosophical explanation about why we, in informal contexts, take some facts as contingently unknowable. In order to accomplish that goal, we develop a theory that defines contingently unknowable facts in a very specific way. We establish three clauses that are jointly necessary and sufficient — so we argue — for taking an arbitrary fact as contingently unknowable. In a variety of contexts, this strategy has the potential of reducing efforts in an epistemological analysis of this particular type of unknowabilitypt_BR


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